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Abstract
Software vulnerability disclosure has become a critical area of concern for policy-makers. Tradition-
ally, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) acts as an infomediary between benign identifiers
(who voluntarily report vulnerability information) and software users. After verifying a reported vulner-
ability, CERT sends out a public “advisory” so that users can safeguard their systems against potential
exploits. Lately, firms such as iDefense have been implementing a new market-based approach for vul-
nerability information. The “market-based” infomediary provides monetary rewards to identifiers for
each vulnerability reported. The infomediary then shares this information with its client base. Using this
information, clients protect themselves against potential attacks that exploit those specific vulnerabilities.
The key question addressed in our paper is whether movement towards such a market-based mech-
anism for vulnerability disclosure leads to a better social outcome. Our analysis demonstrates that an
active unregulated “market-based mechanism” for vulnerabilities almost always underperforms a pas-
sive CERT-type mechanism. This counter-intuitive result is attributed to the market-based infomediary’s
incentive to leak the vulnerability information inappropriately. If a profit-maximizing firm is not allowed
to (or chooses not to) leak vulnerability information, we find that social welfare improves. But even a
regulated market-based mechanism performs better than a CERT-type one, only under certain conditions.
Finally, we extend our analysis and show that a proposed mechanism – “federally-funded social planner”
– always performs better than a market-based mechanism.
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1 Introduction
One of government’s fundamental jobs is deciding what goods and services should be provided by which
types of markets. The Unites States has decided that postal delivery and national defense services should
be provided by the government. Utilities used to be primarily regulated monopolies but now operate in
regulated competition. Grocery stores are largely unregulated. Ideally, the choice is made on the basis of
social welfare, including efficiency and equity considerations. Here, we offer the first such analysis with
regard to the market for software vulnerability detection.
Attacks exploiting software vulnerabilities (or bugs as they are commonly known) are believed to
cause significant economic damage. A recent study by NIST (2002) estimates the number in the range of 60
billion dollars per year. Given the enormity of damage and the fact that vulnerabilities cannot be completely
eliminated in software, vulnerability disclosure has become a critical area of concern for policy-makers
(e Week, 2003).
Traditionally, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) acts as an infomediary between benign
identifiers, who report vulnerability information, and software users. CERT’s role evolved during the early
days of the Internet when vulnerability discovery and reporting was relatively infrequent. Since no market
existed for vulnerabilities, CERT’s role was crucial in disseminating vulnerability information. After veri-
fying a reported vulnerability and coordinating with vendors, CERT typically sends out a public “advisory”
to allow users to safeguard their systems against potential exploits. In order to ensure that such public noti-
fications are not exploited by hackers to attack software users, CERT follows a series of steps before such a
disclosure. The steps include contacting the vendor for the appropriate patch, and waiting for an appropriate
time before publicly disclosing the vulnerability. In this traditional mechanism, reporting vulnerabilities is
voluntary with no explicit monetary gains to benign identifiers.
Lately, the number of vulnerabilities discovered has increased. For example, 4,129 vulnerabilities
were reported in 2002, whereas only 1,090 were reported in 2000 (CERT, 2003). This has also led to the
creation of a market for vulnerabilities, where firms such as iDefense have been acting as infomediaries.
In this market-based mechanism, the infomediary offers a monetary reward to the identifiers for every vul-
nerability reported to it. The infomediary then shares this information with users who are subscribed to its
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service. Subscribers use this information along with other value added services provided by the infomediary,
such as patches or filters to protect them against attacks that exploit that vulnerability.
The key question addressed in this paper is whether such a movement towards a market-based mech-
anism leads to a better social outcome? The answer is not obvious. On one hand, monetary incentives to
discover vulnerabilities may encourage benign identifiers to invest more effort and time in finding them,
thereby generating a better social outcome. On the other hand, the same incentives may also lead to a race
for vulnerability discovery between benign identifiers and hackers. A similar behavior has been observed
in R&D competitions where firms race to be an innovator (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980, Reinganum,
1982). If racing happens and the number of vulnerabilities discovered by hackers increases, it may decrease
social welfare. Note that a monopolistic market-based infomediary has an incentive to serve only a fraction
of the entire market, thereby exposing non-subscribers to attacks. Moreover, the non-subscribers may also
suffer if the monopolist misuses vulnerability information to increase its profits by leaking it to the public
and exposing non-subscribers to more attacks. This may lead to a further decrease in social welfare. We
term such a market as an unregulated market. However, even in a regulated market, where a market-based
infomediary cannot misuse information, the answer is unclear.
From a policy-maker’s perspective, understanding this question is crucial. If markets perform at
least as well as the traditional CERT-type mechanisms, then policy-makers need to reshape the role of such
institutions in the future. Moreover, this also means that our policies should encourage such markets. On
the other hand, if markets decrease welfare and they are here to stay, then policy-makers need to think
about regulations that may achieve the desired objective. One key contribution of our paper is to argue that
while software security typically has been a domain of computer scientists and technical researchers, it is
the emerging economic and policy issues that have significant welfare implications. Even so, there is little
academic research in this area to draw from. Our paper tries to bridge this gap by analyzing the economic
efficacy of these mechanisms and by providing appropriate policy guidelines.
One striking finding of our paper is that unregulated markets almost always perform worse than
even a “no market” case. This is in contrast to traditional economic models where even a monopolistic
market is better than no market at all. We observe this counter-intuitive result in the domain of vulnerability
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disclosure because a monopolist has incentives to use vulnerability information in a socially detrimental way.
This result suggests that some regulatory guidelines are necessary for proper disclosure of vulnerability
information. We then extend the model to show that even when the market is regulated, under certain
conditions (as long as users voluntarily find the vulnerabilities with high enough probability), the passive
CERT-type mechanism is better than the market-based mechanism. The key intuition is that even though a
market-maker increases the supply of vulnerabilities, this increased supply is socially detrimental because it
forces the users to pay higher rents to subscribe to the market-maker’s services.
Another key finding is that the payment for vulnerability discovery encourages the benign identifier
to exert a higher effort which imposes a negative externality on the effort of the hackers. Since the hackers’
incentives to find vulnerabilities reduce, it improves the social benefits. We build on these two key findings
to formulate a new mechanism. Specifically, we show that the CERT-type mechanism is the most beneficial
when it funds vulnerability discovery by paying benign identifiers. Based on this result, we argue that CERT
should create incentives for the benign identifiers to discover vulnerabilities and report them.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature most relevant to this topic.
Following that in section 3, we first provide a general model. We then provide details of the unregulated
market-based mechanism and its comparison to the CERT-type one in section 4. In section 5, we discuss
the regulations of the regulated market-based mechanism and compare its welfare metrics against that of
the CERT-type mechanism. In section 6, we analyze the federally-funded mechanism and study its welfare
implications relative to other mechanisms. Following that, we present our concluding remarks in section 7.
2 Literature Review
Much of the prior work in the software vulnerability and information security area has focused on the
technical aspects of the problem. For example, Krsul et al. (1998), Du and Mathur (1998a), and Du and
Mathur (1998b) analyze and classify different software errors that lead to security breaches. Only a few
papers have analyzed economic issues related to problems in the information security.
One of the few papers to discuss markets for vulnerabilities is Camp and Wolfram (2000). But the
focus of their work is different. They describe a means for creating a market for vulnerabilities in order to
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increase the security of systems. They contend that government intervention by issuing a new currency in the
form of credits for security vulnerabilities will provide incentives to make systems more secure. Similarly,
Schechter (2002) argues that vendors should create and exploit a market for testers. He concludes that
encouraging competition among testers by using incentives to discover vulnerabilities can serve to improve
quality.
Gordon et al. (2002) discuss how the economic issues related to information sharing in Information
Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs), created under the Presidential Decision Directive 63 for sharing in-
formation security issues, are similar to those in trade associations. In their paper, they also provide an
overview for developing economic models to study issues such as free-riding, which Varian (2002) has rec-
ognized as important element in the information security space. Two other papers – Gordon et al. (2003) and
Gal-Or and Ghose (2003) – have followed up on this idea and developed game-theoretic models to study the
economic consequences of sharing security information in ISACs. The focus of Gordon et al. (2003) is on
how information sharing affects the overall level of information security by examining the effect of security
investment on expected security costs. While Gordon et al. (2003) focus on the cost side, Gal-Or and Ghose
(2003) focus on the demand side effects of security breaches and information sharing.
In addition, a few other papers have analyzed security investments that software users undertake to
protect themselves against potential exploits. Gordon and Loeb (2002) develop an economic model for in-
formation security investment decisions. They analytically demonstrate that the optimal level of information
security spending does not always increase with the expected loss from attacks and that this level of security
spending must be far less than the expected loss from attacks. Another paper by Schechter and Smith (2003)
discusses how security investments must take into account the intruder’s cost of breaking-in.
Arora et al. (2003) develop an economic model to study a vendor’s decision of when to introduce
its product and whether or not to patch vulnerabilities in its software. Interestingly, they observe that the
profit-maximizing vendor delivers a product that has fewer vulnerabilities than a social-welfare maximizing
vendor. However, the profit-maximizing vendor is less willing to patch.
To our knowledge, no prior work has addressed specific issues discussed in the introduction. Practi-
tioners in different capacities have been proposing different legal/economic frameworks for software vulner-
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ability disclosure (Security-Focus, 2003, e Week, 2003). Arora et al. (2004) provide an economic decision
making framework for disclosing vulnerabilities. In a New York Times article Varian (2000b) suggests that
information security can be improved by first assigning legal liability. Along with a legal framework, he
argues that an insurance framework can provide the correct market-based incentive structure (see Yurcik
and Doss, 2002, Gordon et al., 2003, for issues related to cyber-insurance). But since this area of research
is relatively nascent and much of the work is yet to come, policy-makers are left with little guidance in un-
derstanding the implications of different frameworks. In line with this motivation, our paper mainly draws
from the basic industrial organization literature by providing a formal model to analyze different disclosure
mechanisms in the information security domain.
3 Model
Figure 1: Structure of the model
Figure 1 outlines the basic structure of our model. Our model has four main participants – the
infomediary (like iDefense or CERT), a benign identifier1, a hacker, and software users. In this paper,
1We demonstrate that the key results shown by assuming a single benign identifier hold even if we generalize to n benign
identifiers. The details are at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html
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we consider a monopolistic infomediary for two primary reasons. First, this market is likely to yield to a
monopolistic structure because an infomediary that buys information from the benign identifier amortizes
the cost of acquisition over its subscriber base. Therefore, a firm with a larger customer base can always drive
out smaller players by virtue of its size and scale. Typically, markets for information-goods display such
characteristics, yielding either a dominant firm or many differentiated firms that are like local monopolies
(see page 25 in Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Second, given that the market of vulnerabilities is itself relatively
new and the pertinent mechanisms are not well understood, understanding the implication of a monopolistic
structure is important before studying the implications of an oligopolistic market.
Let the informediary pay pb as a reward to the benign identifier for reporting a vulnerability. Let
ps represent the one-time subscription fee that the infomediary charges to each of its subscribers. The
(pb, ps) pair set by the infomediary determines the number of subscribers (and hence the fraction of the
market subscribing), the number of vulnerabilities reported by the benign identifier and the probability of
attacks. But the optimal prices pb and ps, in turn, are determined by the fraction of the market subscribing,
the number of vulnerabilities reported, etc. Therefore, we model this as a two period game. In the first
period, the infomediary sets its optimal pricing policy and in the second period, all other players – software
users, the benign identifier and the hacker – react. However when solving this game, we first solve for the
reaction of the benign identifier, the hacker, and software users for a given (pb, ps) pair, and then solve for
the optimal (pb, ps) using backward induction. Ultimately, our goal is to calculate the welfare-metrics – the
overall industry loss and the overall user loss – for each mechanism.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is one vulnerability in the product and that the
benign identifier and the hacker attempt to discover it. Having only one vulnerability allows us to model
everything as probability measures. Let Khacker be the probability that the vulnerability is first discovered by
the hacker. In this case, the hacker exploits the vulnerability to attack all users (including the infomediary’s
subscribers). Similarly, let Kreported be the probability that the vulnerability is first discovered by the benign
identifier who reports it to the infomediary. Note that, by definition, the benign identifier does not exploit
the vulnerability. After obtaining the vulnerability information, the infomediary notifies its subscribers so
that they can protect their systems against potential future attacks. Let Kprevented represent the probability that
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the attack is prevented by subscribing to the infomediary’s service.
The key consideration here is what does the infomediary do with the vulnerability information? Once
its subscribers are protected, the infomediary could either disclose vulnerability information to the public
without proper safeguards, or inform the vendor and disclose the information responsibly. If the infomediary
“leaks” the vulnerability to the public without proper safeguards, then the hacker can exploit that vulnera-
bility to attack non-subscribers easily. In this case, when the benign identifier discovers the vulnerability,
the hacker also benefits. On the other hand, if the infomediary discloses the information in a “responsible”
fashion, then non-subscribers are affected only if the hacker is able to find that vulnerability on its own.
Note that in this case, the hacker benefits only from discovering the vulnerability by itself.
When the market-based infomediary leaks vulnerability information, we refer to it as the unregulated
market-based mechanism. In contrast, the market-based infomediary in a regulated market will make the
information public only with proper safeguards and users not subscribed to its service are not affected
adversely. Therefore in our model,
Kprevented =
 K
leak
prevented if it is an unregulated market
Kno leakprevented if it is a regulated market
We use the variables with superscripts, Kno leakprevented and K leakprevented, only to distinguish between the regulated and
the unregulated cases. Otherwise, we use Kprevented. A related point to note is that the (pb, ps) pair chosen by
the infomediary is dictated by its decision to leak. We first begin with the unregulated market in which the
infomediary can leak the information.
4 Unregulated Market
Now, we are ready to sketch the behavior of software users, benign identifier and the hacker when the
infomediary sets a price pair (pb, ps).
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4.1 Modeling Software Users, the Benign Identifier and the Hacker
Without loss of generality, we normalize the total number of software-users in the market to one. This means
that we deal with the fraction of the market subscribed to the infomediary’s service, denoted by η, instead
of the number of subscribers. Our objective, in this subsection, is to characterize the expressions for the
probabilities Kreported,K leakprevented,Khacker and η as functions of pb and ps.
4.1.1 Characterizing Subscribers
We assume that software users are heterogeneous in terms of the loss they incur when a vulnerability is
exploited. Let the user loss-type, θ, be distributed on the interval [0, θ] according to the distribution function
F (θ). Any software user i of type θi is assumed to incur a loss of θ2i when the vulnerability is exploited. The
software users have the option of preventing attacks on their systems by subscribing to the infomediary’s
service. Let the subscription fee charged by infomediary be ps. Any user i, whose expected avoidance of
loss from subscribing
Πuser = θ2i K
leak
prevented − ps > 0 (1)
subscribes to the service. In this expression, the first term corresponds to the loss prevented by subscribing
to the service. Note that K leakprevented is a function of pb, which the infomediary pays to benign identifiers for
discovering vulnerability. The second term corresponds to the payment made to the infomediary. Therefore,
only those software users whose θi satisfies the following condition subscribe to the service:
θi >
√
ps
K leakprevented
(2)
Since θ is assumed to have a distribution function F (θ), the fraction of the market subscribed to the infome-
diary’s service is:
η = 1− F
(√
ps
K leakprevented
)
(3)
In a mechanism where software users are not charged any price at all, then ps = 0, and η = 1. This implies
that all users are provided with the vulnerability information.
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4.1.2 Characterizing Kreported, K leakprevented, and Khacker
We now characterize the probabilities Kreported, K leakprevented, and Khacker as functions of pb and ps. Note that these
probabilities determine the welfare-metrics, user loss and industry loss, that are defined in the following
subsection.
The (pb, ps) pair set by the infomediary determines the effort levels exerted by the benign identifier
and the hacker, which dictate these probabilities. Let α be the effort exerted by the benign identifier and β
be the effort exerted by the hacker. Then, the functional form for Kreported, K leakprevented, and Khacker would satisfy
the following intuitive criteria:
• ∂Kreported∂α > 0 and ∂Khacker∂β > 0: The probability that the vulnerability is reported increases with the
benign identifier’s effort. Similarly, higher efforts by the hacker leads to a higher probability that he
will discover the vulnerability first. These expressions are akin to positive elasticity of “own” efforts.
• ∂Kreported∂β < 0 and ∂Khacker∂α < 0: The probability that the vulnerability is discovered by the benign identi-
fier decreases with the hacker’s effort. Similarly, the probability of the hacker finding the vulnerability
decreases with the benign identifier’s efforts. These expressions are akin to negative “cross-elasticity”
of efforts.
For analytical tractability and to be able to solve for equilibrium, we need to characterize the expres-
sions for these probabilities. In the following section, we obtain the functional form for these probabilities
by modeling the competition between a benign identifier and a hacker within the software’s life cycle period,
T .
Competition between the Benign Identifier and the Hacker
We assume a uniform probability density function (pdf) for the vulnerability being discovered by either
player (benign identifier or the hacker) at any time t < T without exerting any effort. Hence the pdf is given
by γT . Therefore, the probability that the player will discover the vulnerability within time period T equals
γ where γ ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, γ corresponds to the probability with which each player discovers the
vulnerability without exerting any effort. Players can alter γ, and hence the pdf, by exerting effort. We
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assume that a benign identifier exerts an effort α. This effort increases its pdf to α+γT . Similarly, the hacker
exerts an effort level of β that increases its pdf to β+γT . Note that we use the additive functional form simply
for tractability reasons.2
Investing effort is costly for both the benign identifier and the hacker. Therefore, they invest effort in
an optimal manner. Their effort level is determined by the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium that emerges
from competition between them. The effort parameters, α and β, are assumed to be set for the entire
duration, T , and cannot be modified during the game. Given the effort levels α and β, we can now compute
the probabilities:
• The probability that the vulnerability is reported, Kreported, corresponds to the probability that the vul-
nerability is first discovered by the benign identifier and reported to the infomediary:
Kreported =
∫ T
0
Probability(benign = t) Probability(hacker < t) dt
where Probability(benign = t) is the probability that the vulnerability is identified by the benign
identifier at time t by exerting an effort α, and Probability(hacker < t) is the probability that the
vulnerability has not been identified by the hacker exerting effort β by time t. Therefore,
Kreported =
∫ T
0
α+ γ
T
(
1− (β + γ)t
T
)
dt = (α+ γ)
(
1− (β + γ)
2
)
(4)
• In general, the probability that an attack is prevented, Kprevented, affects the value provided by the
infomediary’s service for a user of loss-type θi. It is important to note that when the infomediary
in an unregulated market leaks the vulnerability information without proper safeguards, all reported
vulnerabilities become exploitable. Thus by subscribing to the infomediary’s service, a user can
prevent all those attacks that occur whenever the benign identifier reports the vulnerability to the
2We show that similar results are obtained when using a multiplicative form. The details are at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
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infomediary.3 Under leakage,
K leakprevented = Kreported = (α+ γ)
(
1− (β + γ)
2
)
(5)
We will calculate Kno leakprevented in the next section.
• Finally, the probability that the vulnerability is first discovered by the hacker, Khacker, is
Khacker =
∫ T
0
Probability(hacker = t) Probability(benign < t) dt
= (β + γ)
(
1− (α+ γ)
2
)
(6)
When the vulnerability is first discovered by the hacker, the hacker attacks all users including the
subscribers of infomediary’s service.
Optimal Effort Level
We use these probabilities to compute the optimal effort exerted by the benign identifier and the hacker.
Recall that the effort exerted by the benign identifier increases her probability of finding the vulnerability to
α+γ. This effort is rewarded with pb if she discovers the vulnerability before the hacker. Since Kreported is the
probability that the benign identifier discovers the vulnerability first, her expected revenue is pb Kreported. For
some effort level α, the benign identifier’s cost is C(α). Thus, the expected profit for the benign identifier
is:
Πb = Kreported pb − C(α)
For obtaining an interior optimal solution, we require that Πb be concave in α. Since the revenue
3In our analysis, we assume that when the infomediary leaks, it serves to benefit the hacker only. In general, the non-subscribers
can also find out about the leaked information and act on it, but the search cost will likely be very high. If we were to model
this by assuming that non-subscribers are able to find and use the leaked information to successfully prevent attacks with certain
probability, the expected avoidance of loss for the users (equation 1) would change slightly by containing this probability term.
However, all our main results and insights would continue to hold. For the simplicity of exposition, we ignore the case when
leakage benefits the non-subscribers.
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increases linearly with α, any convex cost function will suffice. In our model, we use the commonly used
quadratic function, C(α) = Mα2, where M is the cost of the exerting effort. Some restrictions will be
placed on the size of M in order to ensure that the probabilities α + γ and β + γ are bounded in [0, 1].
Substituting for C(α) and Kreported in Πb, we get
Πb = (α+ γ)
(
1− (β + γ)
2
)
pb −M α2 (7)
Next, let us consider the hacker’s expected profit. The hacker benefits by attacking all users if he
discovers the vulnerability first. But if he discovers the vulnerability after the benign identifier, he obtains
the profit only from attacking users who are not infomediary’s subscribers.4 We assume that if the hacker is
successful in attacking a user of type θi, he gains a profit of θi. Note that the functional form of the hacker’s
profit function is intentionally made to be different from the loss suffered by the user – θ2i .5 The hacker’s
cost is C(β). Therefore,
Πh = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ dF (θ)
)
+K leakprevented
∫ √ psKleakprevented
0
θ dF (θ)
− C(β)
In the first term, Khacker corresponds to the probability that the hacker discovers the vulnerability first and
attacks all users.6 The term inside the integral is the expected profit from attacking all the users. Similarly in
the second term, K leakprevented corresponds to the probability that the hacker discovers the vulnerability after the
benign identifier. The integral in the second term is the expected profit for the hacker from attacking users
that are not subscribed to the infomediary’s service. The last term corresponds to the cost of exerting effort.
4It is trivial to show that the hacker never finds it optimal to sell the vulnerability.
5In some cases, the hackers may gain a lot by exploiting a vulnerability even though users may not lose a lot. In some other
cases, the hackers may not gain much, but the cost to the user could be significant. For example, hackers might take down a
web-site, causing significant damages to users but with little benefits to them.
6In reality, the hackers may attack users over a time period rather than instantaneously. One can potentially add a scaling
constant to accommodate such scenario.
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Substituting for Khacker, integrating by parts, and using κ =
√
ps
K leakprevented
, we get
Πh = Khacker
(
θ −
∫ θ
0
F (θ) dθ
)
+K leakprevented
(
κ F (κ)−
∫ κ
0
F (θ) dθ
)
− C(β)
The optimal hacker effort, β∗, is a solution of this implicit equation which requires some functional
form assumption for F (θ). To ensure analytical tractability, we let θ be distributed uniformly [0, θ]. This
means that F (θ) = θ
θ
. Note that this assumption, when combined with the non-linear loss function – θ2i
– assumed for each user, reflects the empirical observations quite well. That is, many users suffer smaller
losses while a few users suffer huge losses. Substituting for F (θ) and simplifying the equation, we obtain
Πh = (β + γ)
(
1− (α+ γ)
2
)
θ
2
+K leakprevented
ps
K leakprevented 2θ
−M β2
= (β + γ)
(
1− (α+ γ)
2
)
θ
2
+
ps
2θ
−M β2 (8)
To obtain the optimal effort level of the benign identifier (α) and the hacker (β), we take the first
order condition on their expected profit expressions and solve the resulting simultaneous equations:
α∗ =
(8M − θ) pb (2− γ)
32M2 − pb θ
β∗ =
(2− γ)(4M − pb)θ
32M2 − pb θ
Note that since α + γ and β + γ are probabilities, they should be bounded [0, 1] for any reasonable
result. We bound these by restricting the cost of effort M . Let Mth be the threshold value above which the
probabilities are bounded (we derive the expression for Mth when we compare the different mechanisms).
For the rest of the analysis, we assume M > Mth.
For M > Mth, we observe the following properties in these equations:
• Both α and β are independent of ps, the one-time subscription fee that the infomediary charges its
subscribers for its service.
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Figure 2: Optimal α and β with pb
• As pb increases, α increases but β decreases. Figure 2 captures the variation of α and β with pb for
γ = 0, M = 24 and θ = 7. This suggests that while effort exerted by the benign identifier increases
with pb, this, in turn imposes a negative externality on the hacker’s incentives and reduces his efforts.
• For a given pb, both the benign identifier and the hacker have incentives to increase their efforts as γ
decreases.
• Finally, as M increases (i.e. the cost of exerting effort increases), the optimal effort levels, α∗ and β∗,
decrease.
Functional Forms
Using α∗ and β∗ in equations 4, 5 and 6, we can compute the following probabilities:
K leakprevented = Kreported =
4(2− γ)M(8M − θ)(16γM2 + 8Mpb − 4γMpb − pbθ)
(32M2 − pbθ)2
(9)
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Khacker =
8(2− γ)M(4M − pb)(16γM2 + 4Mθ − 2γMθ − pbθ)
(32M2 − pbθ)2
(10)
Note that ∂Kreported∂pb > 0 and
∂Khacker
∂pb
< 0. Therefore, the hacker and the benign identifier impose
negative externality on each other. Moreover, as the baseline probability of discovering the vulnerability
without effort – γ – increases, all three probabilities increase i.e., ∂Kreported∂γ > 0,
∂K leakprevented
∂γ > 0, and
∂Khacker
∂γ >
0. Finally as the cost of effort, M , increases, all three probabilities decrease i.e.,∂Kreported∂M < 0,
∂K leakprevented
∂M < 0,
and ∂Khacker∂M < 0.
4.2 Optimal Pricing pb and ps
As is common in the subgame perfect equilibrium, we first calculate the second period consequence of first
period action and based on those outcomes, calculate the optimal first period actions. For the unregulated
market-based framework, we have computed the optimal K leakprevented, Kreported, and Khacker as functions of pb and
ps. Now based on these probabilities, we calculate the optimal ps and pb that the market-based infomediary
needs to set when it enters the market.
The infomediary maximizes the following profit function
max
pb,ps
η ps −Kreportedpb
The first term corresponds to the revenue that the infomediary generates by charging its subscribers ps. The
second term is the cost it incurs to pay for each vulnerability reported. Substituting for η from equation 3
and using F (θ) = θ
θ
, we have
max
pb,ps
(
1− 1
θ
√
ps
K leakprevented
)
ps −Kreported pb (11)
We take the first order derivative w.r.t. ps and pb, and solve the simultaneous equations to get
p∗s =
4K leakpreventedθ
2
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p∗b = −
32M2(108γM2 − 4(2− γ)Mθ2 + (1− γ)θ3)
1728(2− γ)M3 − 108(4− γ)M2θ − 4(2− γ)Mθ3 + θ4
Note that ∂p
∗
b
∂γ < 0, which implies that as identifiers voluntarily provide vulnerability information, incentives
to fund vulnerability disclosure decreases.
Thus far, we make the assumption that no resale (or sharing) of information by subscribers is possible.
In general, high transaction, technical, and legal barriers will make it difficult for secondary markets to exist
and therefore this is a standard assumption in the literature (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999). But the issue
of sharing has been addressed in different contexts in the prior literature. One of the main results from
Varian (2000a) is that when the marginal cost of production is zero and even when transaction costs are
zero, sharing among consumers occurs but the firm sells a lower number of units at a proportionately higher
price. This means that the same fraction of the market which was not covered without sharing will not be
covered even with sharing, and our results will continue to hold. A similar argument is also provided in
Bakos et al. (1999).7 We are now ready to define the welfare-metrics.
4.2.1 Welfare-Metrics
Our final goal is to analyze the welfare changes under different market conditions. To measure the efficacy
of this unregulated market-based mechanism, we define the overall user loss and the overall industry loss.
Note that these metrics are computed assuming that the total number of software-users in the market is
normalized to one. Now, consider the user loss expression:
ULleakMARKET = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+K leakprevented
(∫ (1−η)θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+ η ps (12)
The first term in the expression corresponds to the loss incurred when the hacker discovers the vulnerability
first and attacks all users. The second term corresponds to the loss incurred when the hacker discovers
the vulnerability after the benign identifier. In this case, the hacker attacks only those users who are not
subscribed to the infomediary’s service. The last term corresponds to the payment made by the subscribers.
7We thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing us to the issue of resale and secondary market.
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By substituting for p∗s , p∗b , K leakprevented and Khacker, one can compute ULleakMARKET.
Similarly, one can compute the overall industry loss by combining user loss equation 12 with the
infomediary’s profit to obtain the industry loss expression:
ILleakMARKET = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+K leakprevented
(∫ (1−η)θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+Kreported pb (13)
When we compute the industry profits, the term η ps, which appears in equation 12, does not appear
in equation 13. This is because η ps is simply the transfer of rent from subscribers to the infomediary. Thus,
the only remaining term is the expected payment made by the infomediary for vulnerability disclosure and
it appears in equation 13.
From the expressions above, the following observation is worth noting. For a given θ, pb, ps and
M , recall that K leakprevented, Khacker, and Kreported increase as γ increases. But as γ increases, p∗b decreases, which
further aids the increase in Khacker (since ∂Khacker∂pb < 0). Both these factors make ULleakMARKET and ILleakMARKET
increase with γ.
4.3 User Loss in the CERT-Type Mechanism
Recall that in the CERT-type mechanism, no money is paid to the benign identifier for reporting the vul-
nerability, i.e., pb = 0. Also, no subscription is charged and the vulnerability information is provided to all
users, i.e., ps = 0 and η = 1. Given this, the user loss and the industry loss are identical in the CERT-type
mechanism:
ULCERT = ILCERT = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
(14)
These losses are identical because there is no transfer of payment in this mechanism. To compute this
equation, we derive the expression for Khacker using a framework similar to that in the earlier section. Recall
that we had characterized Khacker as follows:
Khacker = (β + γ)
(
1− α+ γ
2
)
(15)
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To obtain the optimal effort level, we consider the expected profit expressions for the benign identifier and
the hacker under the CERT-type mechanism (i.e. pb = 0):
Πb = −M α2
Πh = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ dF (θ)
)
−Mβ2
First order conditions will give the optimal α∗ and β∗. Clearly, α∗ = 0 and the benign identifier
does not exert any effort at all. However, the vulnerability is still discovered by the benign identifier with a
probability of γ, and, by assumption, the vulnerability is always reported to the infomediary. On the other
hand, the hacker invests an optimal β to discover the vulnerability. This is given by β∗ = (2−γ)θ8M . Using α
∗
and β∗ in equation 15, we compute Khacker, which is then substituted back in equation 14 to obtain:
ULCERT = ILCERT =
(2− γ)((2− γ)θ + 8Mγ)θ2
48M
(16)
When γ = 0, ULCERT = ILCERT = θ
3
12 M . This corresponds to the condition when the vulnerability
is never reported to the CERT-type infomediary. But as γ increases, the CERT-type infomediary provides
some value. This is because as γ increases, the probability that the benign identifier reports the vulnerability
is higher. The same is true for the hacker. The hacker also finds it easier to discover the vulnerability which
implies that the probability of an attack that exploits the vulnerability increases. Hence the higher the γ, the
higher the user loss.
Thus far, we have ignored the fixed set-up costs because they have no qualitative effect on the results.
But we note that the fixed set-up costs incurred by the CERT-type infomediary may be funded by the tax-
payers, and not all tax-payers may be benefit from it. Therefore, like any other public expenditure, funding
vulnerability discovery may improve the welfare of some tax-payers (typically computer users who are
affected by software vulnerabilities; according to Jones, 2002, 59% of US population was using computers
and was online in 2002), while some others may be worse off .
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4.4 Comparative Static: CERT Versus an Unregulated Market
How does the unregulated market-based mechanism compare to a CERT-type one? We first begin our
comparison for γ = 0. Recall that α and β values must be bounded between 0 and 1 under both the
CERT-type mechanism and the unregulated market-based mechanism. This translates to M > Mth =
max{ θ4 , θ
2
27} (see Appendix A.1 for details). Thus for any given M , a valid θ should be such that 0 ≤ θ ≤
min{4M,√27M}. Given this, the following proposition outlines the main insight:
Proposition 4.1 1. Even at γ = 0, for a given M , there exists a θ such that the user loss in the unregu-
lated market-based mechanism is more than that in the CERT-type one.
2. At γ = 0, for M > Mˆ , the user loss in the unregulated market-based mechanism is always more than
that in the CERT-type mechanism.
See Appendix A.2 for the proof. The striking part of the result is that even when γ = 0, the market-
based mechanism may under-perform relative to its CERT-type counterpart. Note that since no one reports
any vulnerability information voluntarily to CERT when γ = 0, the CERT-type mechanism has no value for
users and CERT itself has no role to play. In short, there is no market left. But even when γ = 0, the market-
based infomediary gathers vulnerability information from the benign identifier by rewarding discovery and
disseminates that information to its subscribers. In other words, an active market exists. One would expect
that having even a monopolistic market-based infomediary is better than having none at all. But our results
show that a monopolistic market-based infomediary in an unregulated market is almost always worse than
having no market at all from the users’ point of view.
What is the intuition behind this perverse result? The key insight is that a market-based infomediary
in an unregulated framework always has an incentive to misuse the vulnerability information. Whenever the
benign identifier reports the vulnerability information, the infomediary protects its own subscribers and leaks
the information without appropriate safeguards. This leakage exposes non-subscribers to attacks from the
hacker. The leakage also serves to increase the users’ incentives to subscribe to the infomediary’s service.
This allows the monopolist to charge a higher subscription fee, ps, thus eroding user welfare.
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One must ask whether a market-based infomediary faces any legal liability when it leaks vulnerability
information. Currently, there is none (see Preston and Lofton, 2002, for an excellent review of current law
and regulations). The laws are incomplete and inconsistent and each organization follows its own ad-hoc
policy for disclosing vulnerabilities (see Arora et al., 2004, for a discussion on the optimal time to disclose
vulnerability). In fact, there is a large community of users who use full-disclosure lists where vulnerabilities
are disclosed immediately after their discovery in the hopes of pressurizing vendors to quickly release the
patches. Since disclosing vulnerability information is unregulated, market based infomediary can disclose
information without any legal liability.8
It is also interesting to note that many in the information security business believe that firms, indeed,
indulge in “scaring” the market to increase the demand for their products and services (Preston and Lofton,
2002, see page 91). This relates very well to our current model where a market-based infomediary in an
unregulated market has an incentive to leak vulnerability information in order to scare the market, thereby
increasing the demand for its service and improving its profits. In some cases, keeping the vulnerability a
long-term secret may be considered more irresponsible than disclosing it, especially if it is the case that the
monopolist or its subscribers have data that the vulnerability is being used and is not widely known in the
white hat community.9
We consider the next proposition:
Proposition 4.2 For those values of M and θ where the unregulated market performs better than the CERT-
type one at γ = 0, as γ increases, there exists a γ′′ such that for γ > γ′′, the user loss in the CERT-type
mechanism is lower than its unregulated market-based counterpart.
See Appendix A.3 for proof. Figure 3 provides insight into the user loss under the unregulated
market-based mechanism and the CERT-type mechanism for different values of γ (plotted for θ = 10 and
M = 6). Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 highlight the fact that an unregulated market-based mechanism will be
better than the CERT-type mechanism only for a small parameter region. Otherwise, the unregulated market-
based mechanism is worse than a “no market” mechanism like the CERT-type one. Stated differently, doing
8We thank Mr. Vikram Mangalmurti, JD, currently a Cybersecurity and Law Fellow at Carnegie Mellon University, for his input
on this issue.
9We thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing us to the implication of keeping vulnerability information a long-term secret.
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Figure 3: User Loss in the Unregulated Market-Based Mechanism and the CERT-Type Mechanism
nothing to incentivize vulnerability discovery is almost always better than letting a monopolist enter an
unregulated market.
At this juncture, it may be useful to consider whether the specific functional form is driving the
result. However, it is easy to note that our results are fairly robust. As the infomediary increases pb, the
benign identifier increases her effort, thereby imposes a negative externality on the hacker’s effort. Since
infomediary leaks information with probability Kreported which is increasing in pb, all the non-subscribers
now incur higher expected losses. Subscribers certainly incur lower losses as Khacker decreases, but the
infomediary extracts this surplus by charging a higher ps. To show the exact sign and perform comparative
static analysis, we need some structure on our functional forms. However, it is evident that any reasonable
demand curve would lead to similar results.
Therefore, the next question we investigate is whether a regulated market-based mechanism would
perform any better. In a regulated market-based mechanism, the infomediary does not leak the vulnerability
information without proper safeguards. By regulating the leakage, we prevent non-subscribers from being
exposed to any undue vulnerability exploits.
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5 Regulated Market – Without Leakage
Here, we consider a regulated market where the infomediary does not leak the vulnerability information
without proper safeguards. As we noted, currently there are no guidelines for disclosing vulnerabilities.
Thus, this section allows us to understand the impact of such a policy intervention. It is also possible that
the infomediary may voluntarily self-impose some restriction on disclosure. In either case, will such a
regulation help?
Recall that K leakprevented = Kreported for the unregulated market-based mechanism since the vulnerability
discovered by the benign identifier is leaked to the hackers and can only be prevented by subscribing to
the infomediary’s service. But in the regulated market case, Kno leakprevented is simply the probability that the
vulnerability discovered by the benign identifier could have otherwise resulted in attacks. Mathematically,
Kno leakprevented =
∫ T
0
Probability(hacker = t) Probability(benign < t) dt
= (α+ γ)
(
β + γ
2
)
(17)
The other probabilities remain the same:
Khacker = (β + γ)
(
1− α+ γ
2
)
Kreported = (α+ γ)
(
1− β + γ
2
)
Since Kprevented = Kno leakprevented, the value of the infomediary’s service under a regulated market-based
mechanism is different from that in the unregulated market-based mechanism, as is the fraction of the market
that subscribes. This fraction in a regulated market-based mechanism is given by an expression similar to
equation 3:
η = 1− F
(√
ps
Kno leakprevented
)
(18)
Assuming that F (θ) = θ
θ
, we can again find the expected profit for the benign identifier and the hacker,
and solve for α∗ and β∗. The derivation is identical to the unregulated market-based mechanism. The only
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difference is that we now use Kno leakprevented instead of K leakprevented. The derived α∗ and β∗ can be substituted to
compute Khacker,Kreported, and Kno leakprevented (as shown in Appendix A.4). Given these expressions, the infomediary
maximizes its expected profit equation:
max
pb,ps
η ps −Kreportedpb (19)
Substituting for η from equation 18 and assuming F (θ) = θ
θ
, we get:
max
pb,ps
(
1− 1
θ
√
ps
Kno leakprevented
)
ps −Kreported pb (20)
We take the first order derivative w.r.t ps and pb, set those equations to zero, and solve the simultaneous
equations to obtain:
p∗s =
4Kno leakpreventedθ
2
9
p∗b =
32M2(108γM2 − 4γMθ2 − θ3 + γθ3)
−3456M3 + 1728γM3 + 432M2θ − 108γM2θ − 16Mθ3 + 4γMθ3 + θ4
Note that as before, p∗b decreases as γ increases. Intuitively, as γ increases (i.e., as less effort is needed to
discover a vulnerability), the incentive to fund vulnerability discovery also decreases.
Using these values of p∗b , p∗s , Kno leakprevented, and Khacker, we calculate the overall user loss, ULno leakMARKET, and
the overall industry loss, ILno leakMARKET:
ULno leakMARKET = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+Kno leakprevented
(∫ (1−η)θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+ η ps (21)
ILno leakMARKET = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+Kno leakprevented
(∫ (1−η)θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+Kreported pb (22)
Note that the expressions are similar to equations 12 and 13, except that we use Kno leakprevented instead of K leakprevented.
We are again interested in comparing the performance of the regulated market-based mechanism with the
CERT-type mechanism.
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5.1 Comparative Static: CERT Versus Regulated Market
How does the regulated market perform in comparison to a CERT-type mechanism? The following propo-
sition illustrates that the performance of the market-based scheme improves, but only marginally.
Proposition 5.1 There always exists a γ′ > 0 such that for γ ≤ γ′ a regulated market-based mechanism
outperforms the CERT-type mechanism and for γ > γ′, the CERT-type mechanism outperforms the market
based mechanism.
See Appendix A.5 for proof. Reassuringly, we find that when γ = 0, the regulated market-based mechanism
outperforms the CERT-type mechanism. This is because when γ = 0, no vulnerabilities are reported to the
CERT-type infomediary and therefore, the CERT-type mechanism has little value. In contrast, the market-
based mechanism creates incentive for the benign identifier to discover the vulnerability. Since the regulation
prevents the market-based infomediary from misusing the information, we observe that the market-based
scheme outperforms the CERT-type one (which is a “no market” mechanism). Therefore, the idea that even
a monopolist is better than having no market at all holds in this case.
Figure 4: User Loss in the Unregulated Market-Based Mechanism and the CERT-Type Mechanism
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As γ increases, both the CERT-type mechanism and the market-based mechanism incur higher loss.
However, the rate of increase of user loss in the market-based mechanism is higher than that in the CERT-
type mechanism. 10 This implies that markets are better only for some low values of γ. Beyond the critical
value of γ, even the regulated market-based mechanism underperforms. For illustration, we plot the user
loss in both mechanisms for different values of γ in Figure 4 (where θ = 10 and M = 6). As can be seen,
beyond some γ′, the CERT-type mechanism outperforms the regulated market-based mechanism.
6 Is There a Better Mechanism?
The major goal of this paper is to analyze the welfare implications of different software vulnerability dis-
closure mechanisms. We now extend the earlier model to investigate whether a better mechanism exists.
We find that the mechanism that minimizes the overall industry loss is akin to a federally-funded program
where an infomediary like CERT incentivizes vulnerability discovery by paying pb.
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to think why such a mechanism may be better. From
the preceding section, it is clear that offering a reward, pb, to the benign identifier usually improves wel-
fare by reducing the hacker’s incentives to invest in vulnerability discovery. However, in the market-based
mechanisms, the infomediary tends to price out many users by charging the subscription fee ps. Moreover,
in an unregulated market, welfare is reduced due to improper leaking of vulnerability information. In the
federally-funded program, the infomediary maximizes the overall welfare by encouraging discovery by be-
nign identifiers and disclosing vulnerability information to all users. We call such an infomediary a federally
funded social planner.
6.1 Federally-Funded Social Planner
The infomediary’s objective is to choose pb and ps in order to minimize the industry loss given by:
IL = Khacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+Kprevented
∫ √ psKprevented
0
θ2
θ
dθ
+Kreported pb (23)
10For this proof, see the online electronic companion.
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We substitute for the probabilities Khacker and Kreported, take the first order derivative w.r.t ps and pb, and solve
the simultaneous equations to obtain p∗s = 0 and
p∗b =
8M(48γM2 − 4γMθ2 − 2θ3 + γθ3)
−384M2 + 192γM2 + 48Mθ − 12γMθ − 4θ3 + γθ3
p∗s = 0 implies that no subscription is fee charged and all users benefit from the social planner’s
service. Also, p∗b decreases as γ increases. This is intuitive: as the benign identifier finds it easier to search
and report vulnerabilities, there is little reason to encourage vulnerability discovery. From this, it is obvious
that for some value of γ, pb = 0. This corresponds to the federally funded mechanism being identical to the
CERT-type mechanism. We compute the threshold value of γ when the CERT-type mechanism is identical
to the federally-funded mechanism as γFED = 2θ
3
48 M2−4M θ2+θ3 .
Naturally, our interest lies in comparing the two schemes when γ ≤ γFED. How does the welfare
change when CERT starts paying money to the benign identifier? To answer this question, we characterize
the expected loss expressions. Substituting p∗b in Khacker, and then using that expression for Khacker in equation
23, we compute the overall industry loss, ILFED, and similarly, the overall user loss, ULFED. We compare the
federally-funded mechanism against all other mechanisms on both metrics – the overall user-loss and the
overall industry loss.
Proposition 6.1 For γ < γFED, the federally-funded social planner outperforms both the CERT-type mecha-
nism and the regulated market-based mechanism along both the metrics, the overall user loss and the overall
industry loss.
See Appendix A.7 for proof. This is a very interesting result. Essentially, the CERT-type mechanism
will be better-off if it starts paying out some monetary rewards to the benign identifiers, especially if the
probability of the vulnerability being reported voluntarily is low. By incentivizing the benign identifier, a
federally-funded social planner imposes a negative externality on the hacker. Overall, this leads to a better
social outcome.
If monetary payment is difficult to implement, one can argue that even non-monetary benefits might
generate similar results. Therefore, CERT would be able to improve social welfare if it used some non-
26
monetary benefit (e.g., due recognition of the identifier). This is akin to the argument by Dingledine et al.
(2001) that reputation is a form of micro-currency.
7 Conclusion
The domain of software vulnerabilities and their disclosure policies has been receiving a lot of press cover-
age with many worms and viruses causing significant economic damage. Firms involved in this space are
taking dramatic steps to prevent such damages. One such action is when Microsoft announced a reward of
500,000 dollars to nab a hacker (C-Net, 2003). Similarly, firms such as iDefense have been implementing
a new market-based disclosure mechanism. In this mechanism, the infomediary provides monetary rewards
to identifiers who report vulnerabilities. The infomediary then uses this information to protect only those
users who are subscribed to its service. We analyze the implication of this market-based mechanism relative
to other mechanisms and show the following:
• Contrary to market efficiency arguments, a monopolistic market-maker in an unregulated framework
deteriorates the user welfare to the extent that it is almost always worse than having no market at all.
This is because in an unregulated market, the monopolistic market-maker always has an incentive to
leak any vulnerability it receives from the benign identifier without proper safeguards. This serves to
reduce the overall welfare as well.
• When users voluntarily provide vulnerability information, the market-based mechanism does not per-
form as well as the CERT-type mechanism even when it is regulated. When voluntary disclosure is
low, encouraging a market-based mechanism but with regulation is a good idea.
• Finally, the best mechanism is to let CERT fund vulnerability discovery.
We want to draw to the attention of policy-makers as well researchers that even though software
security can be improved by producing quality software and patches, understanding the emerging market
structures and policy implications will play an increasingly crucial role in reducing the costs of vulnerability
exploits. In that regard, our paper is probably the first one that studies the information security market in
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a formal economic setting. The key contribution of our paper is that vulnerability markets need not follow
the same intuitions of the traditional markets and therefore, require proper policy interventions regarding
vulnerability disclosure. We also provide practical incentives that can be adopted for mitigating the costs of
security failures.
While our results have interesting implications, our analysis is not without limitations. For tractability
reasons, we use specific functional forms for the profit functions of the hacker, identifiers and users profit
functions. One future direction would be to use more general functional forms. In addition, we also assume
that attacks on software users occur instantaneously, which can be generalized as well. One may consider
a model of cooperation between the CERT-type infomediary and the market-based infomediary (where they
exchange vulnerability information) that may lead to better results than the current environment, in which
CERT and the market-based firm do not cooperate. Analyzing such a model would be an useful extension.
Finally, empirically validating our model would be another avenue for further research.
A Appendix: Proofs and Values
A.1 Binding Constraints for the Comparison
Since we compare the unregulated market-based mechanism with that of the CERT-type mechanism, we
distinguish our parameters by using subscripts. At γ = 0, αCERT = 0 and βCERT = θ4M . For these probabilities
to be between 0 and 1, M ≥ θ4 .
Similarly at γ = 0,
αleakMARKET =
(8M − θ) θ2
(216M2 − θ3)
β leakMARKET = 1 +
θ
8M
− (8M − θ) 27M
(216M2 − θ3)
Note that for our comparison, both α and β should be between 0 and 1. First for 0 ≤ αleakMARKET ≤ 1, we
require either {θ ≥ 8M , θ ≥ 6M 23 and θ ≥ √27M} or {θ ≤ 8M , θ ≤ 6M 23 and θ ≤ √27M}. Since
θ ≤ 4M in the CERT-type one, the binding constraint can be either θ ≤ 4M or θ ≤ √27M depending on
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M . It is trivial to show that 0 < β leakMARKET < 1 corresponds to the same constraints11. Combining all these,
we get:
θ ≤

√
27M if M ≥ 2716
4M if M < 2716
A.2 Proof for Proposition 4.1
At γ = 0, the difference between the two user losses are given by
∆ = ULleakMARKET − ULCERT
=
(8M − θ)θ4(69120M3 − 31968M2 θ + 56M θ3 + 101 θ4)
1296M(216M2 − θ3)2
=
f1(M, θ) θ
4
f2(M, θ)
1296Mf3(M, θ)
where f1(M, θ) = (8M − θ), f2(M, θ) = (69120M3− 31968M2 θ+56M θ3+101 θ4) and f3(M, θ) =
(216M2 − θ3)2.
A.2.1 Proof for Proposition 4.1 Part 1
It is easy to realize that under both constraints, i.e., M ≥ 2716 and M < 27/16, f1(M, θ) and f3(M, θ)
are positive for all valid θ. This implies that so long as there exists a θ > 0 s.t. f2(M, θ) > 0, we have
proved our result. Notice that at θ = 0, ∆ = 0. But notice that for θ = 0, f2(M, θ) > 0. Further
since f2(M, θ) is a polynomial expression, it is always continuous. Since f1(M, θ) and 1f3(M,θ) are also
continuous in the neighborhood of θ = 0, there exists a θ =  where f2(M, θ) > 0. In this case, since
{f1(M, θ), f2(M, θ), f3(M, θ)} > 0, ∆ > 0 for some θ =  > 0. QED
A.2.2 Proof for Proposition 4.1 Part 2
Independent of the binding constraint, f1(M, θ) and f3(M, θ) are always positive for any valid M and θ.
Therefore for this proof, it is sufficient to show that f2(M, θ) > 0 for any M > Mˆ for any valid θ in
11See online at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html where this is demonstrated.
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0 ≤ θ ≤ √27M .
We first differentiate f2(M, θ) with respect to θ:
∂f2(M, θ)
∂θ
= −31968M2 + 168M θ2 + 404 θ3 (24)
∂2f2(M, θ)
∂θ
2 = 336M θ + 1212 θ
2 (25)
Note that the first derivative is negative at θ = 0. In addition, since the second derivative is always
increasing in θ, the function f2(M, θ) can have only one minima at some θ > 0. Therefore, function f2
is decreasing until it reaches the minima and then increases. If even at the minima, f2(M, θ) is positive
for some values of M , then the proof follows. But this is difficult to show. So instead, we show that for
certain values of M , the minima is to the right of
√
27M (which is the maximum possible value of θ) and
the function f2(M, θ) is always positive at θ =
√
27M . This is equivalent to deriving the condition when
f2(M, θ) is positive and decreasing at θ =
√
27M . In short, we require M to satisfy the following two
constraints:
1. ∂f2(M,θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 at θ = √27M .
2. f2(M, θ) ≥ 0 at θ =
√
27M .
Substituting θ =
√
27M in first inequality leads to 108
(
303
√
3MM − 254M2
)
≤ 0 which implies
M ≥ 4.269. Similarly, substituting θ = √27M in the second inequality leads to
27M2
(
2727− 3384
√
3M + 2560M
)
≥ 0
69120M2
(√
M − 3
8
√
3
)(√
M − 303
320
√
3
)
≥ 0
Since
√
27M is the applicable constraint, M ≥ 2716 to satisfy the inequality. Thus the inequality is satisfied
for M ≥ 2.689. Combining these two inequalities together, it is clear that for M ≥ Mˆ ≈ 4.269, function
f2(M, θ) is always positive in the region 0 ≤ θ ≤
√
27M . Therefore, CERT-type mechanism dominates
the market-based mechanism for M ≥ Mˆ ≈ 4.269. QED
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A.3 Proof for Proposition 4.2
Note that ∆ = ULleakMARKET−ULCERT is continuous and a quadratic function of γ. This implies that independent
of M and θ, the expression for ∆ changes from negative to positive at most once (under certain conditions,
such a point may not even exist in region of our interest). In this proposition, we are considering only those
values of M and θ that result in ∆ being negative at γ = 0. If we demonstrate that ∆ > 0 for the maximum
possible γ value, then the statement of the proposition follows.
We rewrite the difference using the generalized definition of the user loss i.e., equation 12 and use
a superscript notation to distinguish between the CERT-type mechanism and the unregulated market-based
mechanism. In addition, let us also use the property that η = 1 and ps = 0 for the CERT-type mechanism.
Thus,
∆ = K leakhacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+K leakprevented
(∫ (1−ηleak)θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
+ ηleak pleaks −KCERThacker
(∫ θ
0
θ2
θ
dθ
)
Consider the maximum value of γ that makes pleakb > 0 (i.e. beyond this value of γ, the market-
based infomediary would not like to pay for vulnerability discovery). This value of γ is calculated to be
γ leakMARKET =
8Mθ
2−θ3
108M2+4Mθ
2−θ3 . Note that for θ <
√
27M , γno leakMARKET < 1. Also since pleakb = 0 at γno leakMARKET, we have
K leakhacker = K
CERT
hacker. Given this, it can be readily shown that ∆ is positive at γno leakMARKET,
∆ = K leakprevented
(∫ (1−ηleak)θ
0
θ2 dθ
)
+ ηleak pleaks > 0
Therefore corresponding to those values of M and θ, there must exist a γ′′ > 0 such that for all γ ≥ γ′′, the
CERT dominates the market. QED
A.4 Values of Kreported, Khacker and Kno leakprevented
Kno leakprevented =
2(16γM2 + 8Mpb − 4γMpb − pbθ)(16γM2 + 4Mθ − 2γMθ − pbθ)
(32M2 − pbθ)2
(26)
Kreported =
4(2− γ)M(8M − θ)(16γM2 + 8Mpb − 4γMpb − pbθ)
(32M2 − pbθ)2
(27)
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Khacker =
8(2− γ)M(4M − pb)(16γM2 + 4Mθ − 2γMθ − pbθ)
(32M2 − pbθ)2
(28)
A.5 Proof for Proposition 5.1
This proof is similar to the proof for proposition 4.2. Let ∆′ = ULno leakMARKET − ULCERT. Substituting for all the
parameters, we find that ∆′ is a quadratic function of γ. This implies that ∆′ will change from negative to
positive (cross x-axis) only once as γ increases.
When γ = 0, it is trivial to show that ∆′ < 0 i.e., ULCERT > ULno leakMARKET. At the other end, we compute
∆′ at the maximum possible value of γ. Similar to the earlier proof, conisder the value of γ which makes
p∗b = 0. We find this to be γno leakMARKET = θ
3
108M2−4Mθ2+θ3 for the market-based mechanism. At γ
no leak
MARKET, it is
easy to realize that ∆′ > 0, i.e., ULCERT < ULno leakMARKET. But can γno leakMARKET > 1? If θ ≤
√
27M , γno leakMARKET ≤ 1,
otherwise γno leakMARKET > 1. We argue that θ >
√
27M is infeasible. Given our modeling context, p∗b cannot be
greater than 0 at γ = 1. This translates into θ ≤ √27M .
Given our results thus far and the fact that ∆′ is a quadratic function of γ, it is clear that there must
exist a γ′ such that for all γ ≤ γ′, user loss in the market-based mechanism is less the CERT-type and
vice-versa for all γ > γ′.
A.6 Values for Federally-Funded Social Planner
ILFED =
M(24θ3 − 12γθ2(θ − 8M)− γ2(12M + θ2)2
3(96M2 + θ3)
(29)
ULFED =
Mθ
2(12(4− γ)M − γθ2)(192γθ2 + 12Mθ(γ − 4) + γθ2)
3(96M2 + θ3)
(30)
A.7 Proof for Proposition 6.1
Note that the better the mechanism the lower is the loss. We know that ULFED < ILFED. Users do not pay
anything to receive vulnerability information, however the infomediary pays the benign identifier. We also
know that ULCERT = ILCERT, ULleakMARKET > ILleakMARKET and ULno leakMARKET > ILno leakMARKET.
Recall that the objective function optimized by the social planner is to minimize the industry loss over
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all possible ps and pb. By definition, this implies that {ILleakMARKET, ILno leakMARKET, ILCERT} > ILFED. When these in-
equalities are combined with other inequalities mentioned earlier, it is easy to see that {ULleakMARKET, ULno leakMARKET, ULCERT}
≥ ULFED.QED
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